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Background: Universal health coverage (UHC) has provided the impetus for the introduction of publicly funded
health insurance (PFHI) schemes in the mixed health systems of India and many other low- and middle-income
countries. There is a need for a holistic understanding of the pathways of impact of PFHI schemes, including their
role in promoting equity of access.
Methods: This paper applies an equity-oriented evaluation framework to assess the impacts of PFHI schemes in
Chhattisgarh State by synthesising literature from various sources and highlighting knowledge gaps. Data were
collected from an extensive review of publications on PFHI schemes in Chhattisgarh since 2009, including empirical
studies from the first author’s PhD and grey literature such as programme evaluation reports, media articles and
civil society campaign documents. The framework was constructed using concepts and frameworks from the health
policy and systems research literature on UHC, access and health system building blocks, and is underpinned by
the values of equity, human rights and the right to health.
Results: The analysis finds that evidence of equitable enrolment in Chhattisgarh’s PFHI scheme may mask many other
inequities. Firstly, equitable enrolment does not automatically lead to the acceptability of the scheme for the poor or to
equity in utilisation. Utilisation, especially in the private sector, is skewed towards the areas that have the least health and
social need. Secondly, related to this, resource allocation patterns under PFHI deepen the ‘infrastructure inequality trap’,
with resources being effectively transferred from tribal and vulnerable to ‘better-off’ areas and from the public to the private
sector. Thirdly, PFHI fails in its fundamental objective of effective financial protection. Technological innovations, such as the
biometric smart card and billing systems, have not provided the necessary safeguards nor led to greater accountability.
Conclusion: The study shows that development of PFHI schemes, within the context of wider neoliberal policies
promoting private sector provisioning, has negative consequences for health equity and access. More research is needed
on key knowledge gaps related to the impact of PFHI schemes on health systems. An over-reliance on and rapid
expansion of PFHI schemes in India is unlikely to achieve UHC.
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India has a mixed health system, with a large public sec-
tor that is underfunded and fraught with numerous chal-
lenges, and a rapidly growing, unregulated and
heterogeneous private sector [1, 2]. Over the last decade
and a half, there have been two major strands of health
sector reform in India’s mixed health system. The first,
the National Rural Health Mission (since renamed the
National Health Mission) was launched in 2005 and em-
phasises strengthening public health systems to provide
effective healthcare and improve “access, equity, quality,
accountability and effectiveness of public health services”
[3]. The second strand, initiated a few years after the Na-
tional Rural Health Mission was launched, targets cata-
strophic health expenditure by the poor in a variety of
state-level publicly funded health insurance (PFHI)
schemes in states such as Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh
and Tamil Nadu [4]. The Rashtriya Swasthya Bima
Yojana (RSBY) or the National Health Insurance
Scheme, launched by the Ministry of Labour in 2007,
was the first national-level PFHI scheme for the un-
organised sector, providing insurance cover of INR 30,
000 (US$ 424) to Below Poverty Line households for
hospitalisation. RSBY sought to draw extensively on pri-
vate health sector providers. In 2018, the PFHI scheme
was further expanded through Prime Minister Jan Aro-
gya Yojana (PMJAY) under Ayushman Bharat, to an an-
nual coverage of INR 500,000 (US$ 7072) per family [5].
This scheme is expected to cover 100 million families
and 500 million people for hospitalisation costs, corre-
sponding to around 37% of India’s population [5].
One of the core rationales advanced for the introduc-
tion of PFHI schemes in India has been the achievement
of universal health coverage (UHC) [6, 7]. UHC is a glo-
bally advocated concept that aims to ensure “that every-
one within a country can access the health services they
need, which should be of sufficient quality to be effective,
and providing all with financial protection from the costs
of using health services” [8]. Initially, apart from financial
barriers to access, equity and access were not explicitly
part of the discourse on UHC [9–12]. Equity emerged
more strongly in subsequent articulations, and there is
now global consensus that any country moving towards
UHC has to ensure equity as a primary goal [12–15].
In India, inequity is related to socioeconomic and pol-
itical status, caste, class, geography and gender differ-
ences, amongst others, resulting in inequitable health
outcomes, health service utilisation and access to health-
care [16–18]. These dimensions also converge and inter-
sect, exacerbating individual inequities [19, 20]. Health
systems play an important role in either deepening or
addressing wider social inequity [21–23].
As a major current reform in India, it is important to
evaluate PFHI schemes and, in particular, their impactson equity of access. So far, studies on PFHI schemes in
India and in other low- and middle-income countries
(LMICs) have focused more on enrolment, utilisation
and financial protection [24, 25] and less on understand-
ing the perceptions and experiences of people who have
tried to use such schemes [26, 27], or on the pathways
of impact of PFHI through the overall health system and
their relationship to equity; there have been some at-
tempts to analyse the policy-making process [28, 29].
Studies of PFHI schemes in other LMICs (Indonesia,
Ghana, Nigeria, Vietnam, Philippines, Rwanda, Kenya
and Mexico) have commonly found lower enrolment
among the poor, with differences based on rural–urban
divide and education [30–34]. However, where schemes
are specifically designed to enrol the more vulnerable,
better coverage of the poor and of rural populations is
achieved [25, 32].
The evidence on utilisation under PFHI schemes is
mixed [34]. Some studies show increases in financial
protection and healthcare utilisation with enrolment [35,
36], in some instances with pro-poor patterns [37].
Others have found that the expansion of health insur-
ance did not necessarily lead to increased financial pro-
tection indicators or a decrease in out-of-pocket (OOP)
expenditure [38, 39]. The poor and people in remote
areas with poorly staffed facilities tend to have less util-
isation and financial protection [34, 40–43].
In India, lower enrolments have been reported in re-
mote rural areas and poorer districts, among socioeco-
nomically vulnerable communities such as tribal
communities, in female-headed households and in the
poorer quintiles [44–48]. While the overall enrolment of
women in RSBY has been increasing and is equal to that
of men [49], enrolment seems to have become an add-
itional barrier for women to access health services [50].
Similar to the international experience, the impact of
PFHI schemes on hospitalisation has been mixed in
India. Exclusion during enrolment subsequently trans-
lated to lower utilisation by the excluded groups [47].
Studies highlight the inequitable distribution of empa-
nelled hospitals, especially of hospitals in the private sec-
tor, leading to inequitable access [51, 52]. The utilisation
of the public sector is higher for the poor and vulnerable
groups even with insurance [46]. The proportion of
women being hospitalised under the PFHI schemes is
higher than that of men but they have also been more
vulnerable to provider-induced demand [50, 53–55].
The majority of the studies in India have found that
significant levels of OOP expenditure continue despite
insurance coverage, and that PFHI schemes have failed
to protect against catastrophic health expenditure [24,
46, 56–58], especially the poor [59]. OOP expenditure is
higher when utilising private facilities due to impermis-
sible co-payments [44, 59, 60]. Practices by the private
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picking’ of more profitable packages, and provision of a
selective and narrow set of services have been docu-
mented [61, 62]. Lack of transparency and access to
data, information and grievance redress mechanisms
have also been highlighted as problems under PFHI
schemes in India [48, 51, 63].
With the Indian government expanding health insur-
ance through the PMJAY, stepping up research on PFHI
is of high priority. This is especially important in the
light of concerns related to the impact on financial pro-
tection, dynamics of the private and public provisioning,
impact on health priorities, health budgets and health
equity and, ultimately, the ethical basis of such policies
[5, 56, 64, 65]. In this context, there is a need for a holis-
tic understanding of the pathways of impact of such
schemes that take into account equity and access. Such
an analysis is vital to understanding whether the policy
push towards PFHI schemes is achieving the stated pol-
icy goal of achieving UHC.
Aims
This paper applies an equity-based framework to holis-
tically assess the pathways of impact of PFHI schemes in
Chhattisgarh State, from values and objectives, to design,
enrolment, health system effects, equity of access and,
ultimately, people and populations. It proposes a con-
ceptual framework for evaluating India’s PFHI schemes
as instruments of UHC reform and then, using the
framework, the paper synthesises available evidence on
the design, implementation and equity impacts of the
PFHI schemes from Chhattisgarh, highlighting the
current state of and gaps in knowledge.
Conceptual framework
The conceptual framework for assessing pathways of im-
pact on equity of access in PFHI schemes for UHC in
LMICs is presented diagrammatically in Fig. 1.
The framework has been constructed using concepts and
frameworks from the health policy and systems (HPSR) lit-
erature on UHC, access, health system building blocks,
healthcare provisioning in mixed health systems and policy
analysis, and is underpinned by the values of human rights,
including the right to health and equity. The specific inputs
into the framework are summarised in Table 1, along with
the research questions that may be explored under each
concept. The framework seeks to be relevant to re-
searchers, policy-makers, journalists and anyone interested
in studying or understanding PFHI schemes and their im-
plications for the health system, people and populations.
Methods
As a multi-disciplinary field, HPSR draws on a wide var-
iety of research designs, data collection methods (bothqualitative and quantitative) and sources of data, prag-
matically identifying the research methodologies best
able to answer questions generated by real-world prob-
lems [93]. In doing so, HPSR frequently adopts research
approaches outside mainstream biomedical approaches
in order to better understand interaction, perspectives
and contexts [13] or issues of power and politics [96].
This paper similarly draws on a range of data sources
in applying the above conceptual framework to an ana-
lysis of PFHI schemes in Chhattisgarh state. The sources
of data included an extensive review of publications on
PFHI schemes in Chhattisgarh after 2009, including re-
search and media articles by the first author and empir-
ical studies from her PhD, and grey literature such as
programme evaluation reports, media reports, and civil
society campaign and advocacy documents.
The first author has, since 2010, kept a database on
publications related to PFHI schemes in Chhattisgarh.
This database was re-checked and updated through add-
itional searches of published (Medline database) and
grey literature. For the grey literature, website searches
were conducted of state and central government, media
houses, agencies such the World Bank, WHO and
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenar-
beit. The search terms were a combination of Chhattis-
garh, health insurance, UHC, RSBY, Mukhyamantri
Swasthya Bima Yojana (MSBY) and PMJAY. The time
period for the search was from 2009, the year RSBY was
launched. All the articles, reports and other publications
in the updated database were included in the analysis.
Using a framework analysis approach, SN read the avail-
able sources and identified relevant data for each elem-
ent of the conceptual framework.
As this study is based on secondary data analysis, con-
sent procedures were not required. Ethics approval for
the overall PhD research of which this study forms one
component, was obtained from the University of the
Western Cape, South Africa where the first author (SN)
is registered.
Results
Applying the framework to Chhattisgarh state
Chhattisgarh was carved out as a separate state from
Madhya Pradesh in 2000, and has a population of about
25 million people, with 77% of families living in rural
areas [97]. Scheduled Tribes constitute 31% of the popu-
lation while 13% are from the Scheduled Caste category
[97]. Forested areas cover 41% of the State’s total geo-
graphical area [98]. Although Chhattisgarh has seen a
significant improvement in health indicators since 2000
[18, 99], it still lags behind national averages [100].
One of the first states to launch RSBY in 2009, Chhat-
tisgarh expanded PFHI scheme to all families of the state
in 2012 through the MSBY. RSBY covered people living
Fig. 1 A framework for assessing pathways of impact on equity of access in publicly funded health insurance programmes for universal health
coverage in low- and middle-income countries
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the poverty line. These two schemes together made up a
universal scheme. Since September 2018, RSBY has been
subsumed under PMJAY.
In the following section, the equity-based framework is
applied to the case of the universal PFHI scheme (RSBY/
MSBY) in Chhattisgarh, presenting the pathways of im-
pact from values and objectives, to design, implementa-
tion, and impact. The results relating to the impact of
PFHI schemes on the health system and people and pop-
ulations are disaggregated by private and public sector.
Further, results are presented taking into account the
overarching dimensions of the policy process and social,
political and economic context (Fig. 1). It must be recog-
nised that elements of the framework are overlapping.For instance, a study of financing and affordability can
speak to both the impact on health system and on
people. For clarity and understanding of the framework,
the same data are sometimes reported more than once.
Alignment of goals of PFHI in Chhattisgarh with UHC
The overall framing of the PFHI scheme in Chhattisgarh
has followed that of the national scheme that has align-
ment with globally articulated UHC goals [28, 29],
though it has not been studied separately as an instance
of UHC. While RSBY covered the poor, the stated objec-
tives of both RSBY and MSBY are similar and reflect the
UHC principles and goals, bringing together ideas of
universal insurance coverage, financial protection,
equity, access and private sector involvement. This is
Table 1 Inputs into the framework and research questions
Category Key concepts, frameworks and principles Research questions References
UHC and its critiques
and alignment of the
PFHI scheme with
UHC objectives
- Three core UHC goals of financial protection,
coverage of population and of services
In addition:
- Importance of equity within the above
- Focus on appropriateness and quality of services
- Acknowledgement of:
• The right to health for all
• Social determinants of health
• Strengthening of public health systems
• Promotion of health as a social good and not a
commodity
- Emphasis on universal health systems rather than UHC
Value base:
- Right to health
- Human rights
- Equity of access
- Equity of outcome
Do the objectives of the PFHI scheme take into
account financial protection, coverage of population
and of services, and have equity considerations?
Do the objectives refer to the health system as a
whole?
Is there foregrounding of equity in monitoring and
evaluation of the PFHI scheme?
Does it cover a limited package of health services or
does it talk about UHC and systems?
Are appropriateness and quality of services made
explicit and addressed?
Is the scheme aligned with the idea of health being a
fundamental right?
Does the scheme promote health as a social good and
a right or as a commodity?
Are the social determinants of health and structural
drivers of health inequity acknowledged and addressed
within the scheme?
Has the scheme led to equitable access?
Has the scheme led to equitable outcomes?
[9, 10, 12,
66–77]




- Provider selection, intermediaries
- Provider payment mechanisms
- Monitoring, regulation and contracts
- Transparency, access to information and
accountability
Who is covered under the PFHI scheme and what does
it mean in terms of equity of coverage?
What kinds of services are covered?
What are the administrative and implementation
arrangements?
Who pays? How is the payment of premiums
organised? How will the provider be paid?
How is the provider selected?
Are both the private and the public sectors to provide
services under the scheme?
What are the systems for monitoring, regulation and
contracts?
To what extent are equity considerations central to the
design?
Is information on all aspects of the scheme publicly
available?







- Service delivery arrangements
- Information
- Equipment and supply chains
- Governance and leadership
Importance of studying:
- Interactions between the building blocks
- Both hardware (building blocks) and software
(values, relationships)
- Health systems as complex adaptive systems
What has been the impact of the PFHI scheme on
financing, service delivery, human resources and supply
chains? Has it been different for the private and public
sectors?
Have there been any equity implications of the above,
especially with regards to changing resource allocations
and use of earmarked funds for vulnerable groups?
What have been the interactions among the building
blocks of health systems, both among the system’s
hardware (organisational, policy, legal and financing
frameworks) and software (norms, traditions, values,
roles and relationships)?





- Dimensions of access: availability, affordability and
acceptability
- Three dimensions of access interact with each other
to create the opportunity for utilisation and the
possibility of improved health outcomes
- Access needs to be defined in relation to health
needs
- Acceptability as under-studied, including empower-
ment, agency, capacities to ‘navigate and negotiate’
and understanding interactions, perspectives and
contexts
Is the availability of health facilities and health services,
which includes quality (‘effective coverage’) and
appropriateness of services, equitable?
What has been the out-of-pocket expenditure, includ-
ing catastrophic expenditure, incurred by the patient/
family for healthcare or while utilising insurance? Is it
higher or lower for vulnerable people/groups?
Is a conducive service delivery environment being
provided under the PFHI scheme with mechanisms for
negotiating and navigating the system, and providing
information, transparency, accountability and agency to
patients?
What is the nature of the grievance redressal system? Is
it effective, especially for the poor and more vulnerable
groups?
How do the three dimensions create the opportunity
[13, 84–88]
Nandi and Schneider Health Research Policy and Systems           (2020) 18:50 Page 5 of 14
Table 1 Inputs into the framework and research questions (Continued)
Category Key concepts, frameworks and principles Research questions References
for utilisation and what is the implication for equity?
Public/private sector
interactions
- In health systems and schemes that have a public–
private mix in provision of health services, it is critical
to examine the role of each sector separately in
ensuring access and equity and furthering the
objectives of UHC
Has the impact of the PFHI scheme been different on
the private and public sectors?
Has the introduction of a PFHI scheme altered the
healthcare provision practice of private and public
sector providers?
What have been the implications for equity in access?
[2, 89–92]
Policy process - Policy change as a political process
- Process of agenda-setting, decision-making, formula-
tion, implementation and evaluation
- Role of context, actors, interests, ideas, power relations
and institutions
- Located within the political economy of development
Who are the key actors in the policy process?
How does power play out amongst these actors?
What is the impact of social structures and power
differentials on the functioning of the scheme?
What is the nature of the political economy of
healthcare within which this scheme has been
introduced and how does that influence equity?
[93–95]
PFHI publicly funded health insurance, UHC universal health coverage
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that states the following: “Health insurance protects
against the cost of illness, mobilizes funds for health ser-
vices, increases the efficiency of mobilization of funds and
provision for health services, and achieves certain equity
objectives” [101]. The website also calls for “involvement
of community in rural health care for increasing account-
ability”, ensuring “choice to patients among multiple ser-
vice providers”, encouraging public–private partnerships,
and improving mortality and morbidity rates [101]. The
equity dimension is operationalised through universalisa-
tion of the PFHI scheme. However, while the dimensions
of financial protection and equity are clearly visible in
the stated objectives, it lacks considerations regarding
the health system as a whole. There is much emphasis
on engaging the private sector and engaging in public–
private partnerships [101]. Analyses of the genesis of
RSBY nationally have highlighted that the PFHI scheme
was seen as an ‘investment’ in worker productivity and
influenced by considerations of human capital develop-
ment, efficiency and productivity rather than ‘needs’ or
‘rights’, and this led to a narrow and selective scheme
design [28, 29]. Moreover, PFHI schemes have been pro-
moted as a ‘business’ and market-oriented model priori-
tising a for-profit motive [28].
Design of PFHI in Chhattisgarh
All families living in the state are eligible for enrolling in
the scheme, creating a single risk pool. Both MSBY and
RSBY cover a maximum of five family members and re-
quire an annual enrolment process, following which an
annual premium is paid by the government on behalf of
all families to the insurance company. There is active en-
rolment through enrolment camps in villages and health
facilities, during which the family is issued a biometric
smart card [102]. The smart card is intended to be used
for ‘cashless’ hospitalisation at empanelled private and
public hospitals. In addition, as part of regulargovernment policy, people are able to utilise health ser-
vices, including hospitalisation, at all public facilities free
of cost or at a low cost without using the insurance
smart card. In 2017, the state expanded the annual in-
surance cover from INR 30,000 (US$ 424) to INR 50,000
(US$ 707).
As elsewhere in India and in many LMICs, PFHI
schemes in Chhattisgarh cover a limited package of ser-
vices, mostly provided by the private sector. The benefit
package under PFHI schemes in Chhattisgarh includes
hospitalisation and a few non-hospitalised packages such
as dentistry and antenatal care. PFHI schemes in India
have been critiqued for mostly covering hospitalisation
services, and some have argued for its expansion to in-
clude out-patient services [56]. However, others have
highlighted the greater potential risk of fraud in out-
patient care [103].
In India, there are two models of purchaser organisa-
tion in the PFHI schemes. One kind of purchaser organ-
isation is a trust which is an autonomous organisation
set up by the state government to empanel hospitals and
pay the claims. The second involves hiring an insurance
company to handle third-party payments based on the
premium paid. In Chhattisgarh the purchasing arrange-
ment is through an insurance company, selected by gov-
ernment in a bidding process. The insurance company,
in turn, appoints a third-party agency (TPA) to process
the claims. The TPA is also responsible for enrolling all
households.
The provider payment mechanism is a mix of per case,
per procedure and per day rates. Contracts between the
state, the insurance company and the hospitals lay down
the guidelines and conditions for providing services
under the scheme. The providers are required to provide
‘cashless’ treatment on the basis of the pre-determined
package rates and are prohibited from taking any other
charges from patients. The use of biometric smart cards
and a helpline number are seen as the tools for
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dressal. Oversight of the scheme is with the State Nodal
Agency, under the Department of Health and Family
Welfare.
While in the initial few years, utilisation of the scheme
was low leading to profits for the insurance company
[104], the claim amounts subsequently exceeded the
total premium paid. As a consequence of increasing
claim amounts every year, the insurance premiums in
Chhattisgarh have also increased above inflation rates.
For instance, premiums more than doubled from INR
314 (US$ 4.4) in 2012–2013 to INR 732 (US$ 10) per
family in 2016–2017 for an annual cover of INR 30,000
(US$ 424) per family [60]. Currently, for a cover of INR
50,000 (US$ 707) under PMJAY in Chhattisgarh, the an-
nual premium is INR 1100 (US$ 15.6) per family [60].
Chhattisgarh has one of the highest enrolment rates in
the country [18]. Recent programme data shows enrol-
ment to be 80% of families and 60% of individuals [60].
In terms of equity of coverage, enrolment has been
found to be equitable across gender, social groups and
economic categories [105, 106] and highest in the most
vulnerable districts [106]. However, smaller primary
studies show that enrolment percentages among some of
the most vulnerable communities are much lower. For
instance, in a 2016 survey among the Baiga Particularly
Vulnerable Tribal Group, 38% of families were found to
be enrolled [107]. An earlier study documented in-
stances of the TPA bypassing ‘remote’ and inaccessible
villages in enrolment drives [61].
Impact on health system
Research is lacking on the impact of PFHI schemes on
the health system. The section below describes ways to
assess the impact of PFHI schemes on the health system,
using available literature from Chhattisgarh.
Financing Increases in insurance premiums have im-
pacted on resource allocation in health sector budgets.
The share of RSBY/MSBY in the health budget has dou-
bled in the last 3 years, from 6.6% in 2015–2016 to 13%
of the total health budget in 2018–2019, while the bud-
gets for many other health programmes have been stag-
nant or reduced [108].
Programme data on claims and their amounts by re-
gion, social group (ST and SC), income and gender
shows that the most vulnerable districts (mainly areas
with higher ST and SC population) receive the least
funds [104, 106]. Yet, a significant proportion of the
PFHI scheme funds are sourced from the Tribal sub-
plan (39% in 2018–2019) and other budgets meant for
the welfare of STs and SCs [60].
Analysis of flows of funding to public and private sec-
tors show that the private sector receives a much higherproportion of the claims amount than the public sector.
In 2015–2016, the private sector made 75% of the claims
and received 83% of the claims funds [106], a pattern
that has remained the same since the beginning of the
scheme [104].
Service delivery Currently, 609 government hospitals
and 588 private hospitals are empanelled [101]. Patterns
of utilisation of PFHI in the state show that 87% of the
claim amount goes for only the top 5% of the listed pro-
cedures, among which dental, deliveries, cataract and
medical management of diarrhoea/fever are used most
commonly [109]. Media reports suggest that this pattern
has continued under PMJAY as well [110]. On the other
hand, when conditions like multidrug-resistant tubercu-
losis were introduced under PFHI, the participation of
the private sector was reported to be extremely low
[111]. This reflects the practice of ‘cherry picking’ and
the provision of narrow and selective services in the pri-
vate sector documented in formal research [61, 109].
Instances of moral hazard and provider-induced de-
mand, typically associated with insurance schemes, have
also been documented, including cases of unnecessary
hysterectomies by the private sector under RSBY [52,
112, 113]. One media report indicated that, over a period
of just 8 months in 2012, private hospitals submitted
claims for 1800 hysterectomies in Chhattisgarh, many of
which were later deemed unnecessary [113].
Human resources Research analysing the impact of
PFHI schemes on human resource dynamics and labour
markets in the private and public sectors along with
their implications for equity has yet to be conducted.
Observations and anecdotal evidence suggest that PFHI
schemes have increased opportunities for dual practice
by public sector providers and collusive behaviour in
terms of referrals from the public to the private sector
[114].
Equipment and supply chains Similarly, there have not
been any studies on the impact of PFHI schemes on
pharmaceutical and medical device markets, and the ef-
fects on their supply and availability in the public sector.
Specific research questions that could guide such an en-
quiry are listed in Table 1.
Practices of governance and leadership The oversight
and guidance functions of the health system have also
not been explicitly examined in Chhattisgarh’s PFHI
schemes. A qualitative study by the authors revealed a
breakdown of mechanisms for regulation and monitor-
ing, specifically in the private sector, that is reflective of
the overall lack of regulation of healthcare in the state
and country [115]. The biometric smart card did not
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intended and, instead, at times served to extract add-
itional payments from the patients. Grievance redressal
mechanisms, when used, failed to provide relief [115].
Another study documented conflicts of interest of public
officials who were in charge of decisions related to PFHI
policy (for instance, what services to include and their
pricing) and monitoring of the private sector, who were
part-time private providers themselves [60].
Media reports, documentation by civil society and par-
ticipant observation by the first author, have provided
insights into the consequences of persistent governance
failures under the PFHI schemes. These include lack of
action on co-payments in the for-profit private sector or
forcing patients to buy medicines even though they are
covered by the insurance packages [114, 116–118].
Information Advances in information technology have
been seen as the mainstay of information systems under
PFHI schemes. Mechanisms such as the biometric smart
card and information technology-based billing systems
are supposed to enable real-time data, patient access to
information and transparency. However, studies have
found that patients are often not told about the amounts
deducted from their insurance smart card nor given re-
ceipts [104, 115, 119]. Some rural area facilities faced
problems in utilising the scheme due to the lack of regu-
lar internet connectivity [61]. Private hospitals have re-
ported being more able to handle the technological
requirements while government hospitals faced prob-
lems, resulting in higher rejection of claims in these fa-
cilities [61].
Impact on people and populations
As proposed in the framework, the impact of PFHI on
people and populations can be assessed through con-
structs of access (availability, affordability and accept-
ability), resulting in utilisation and ultimately in health
outcomes. Each of these dimensions is approached from
an equity perspective, and public and private sectors are
considered separately. These elements and dimensions
have been studied extensively by the authors themselves.
Analysis of equity in availability of hospital services
under PFHI schemes in Chhattisgarh showed that, while
government hospitals are relatively evenly distributed,
most of the private hospitals are concentrated in only a
few cities and their distribution skewed towards the dis-
tricts having least vulnerability [106, 119]. Another study
showed that the more vulnerable groups, such as
women, people living in rural areas, Scheduled Tribes
and poorer groups, were more likely to utilise the public
than the private sector for hospitalisation [105].
Availability of hospital services also includes the qual-
ity and appropriateness of care (the concept of effectivecoverage) though this aspect has been less studied [120].
As highlighted in the previous section, there are indica-
tions that the PFHI schemes have enabled new forms of
provider-induced demand and promoted patterns of se-
lective provisioning [61, 109].
The authors’ study of affordability based on household
survey data revealed that, of those who were insured and
used private hospitals, only 5% received free services,
while, of those who were insured and used public hospi-
tals, 34% did not incur any OOP expenditures [105]. Of
the insured who incurred OOP expenditures, the median
expenditure in the private sector (INR 10,000 or US$
141) was eight times more than that in the public sector
(INR 1200 or US$ 17) [105]. While those covered with
insurance were less likely to incur OOP expenditure,
women and those going to private hospitals were signifi-
cantly more likely to incur OOP expenditure [105]. Of
households with at least one case of hospitalisation,
35.5% incurred catastrophic health expenditure (>10%
monthly household consumption expenditure) [105].
The main reason for continuing OOP expenditure has
been impermissible co-payments that are charged by the
hospitals from patients who use PFHI schemes [109,
115].
Primary studies have complemented the analysis of
routine household surveys, finding OOP expenditure
continuing among the urban poor and extremely low
utilisation of the scheme by Particularly Vulnerable Tri-
bal Groups [104, 107, 115, 119].
Studies assessing the level and nature of information
provided to the beneficiaries have found that families
were not provided the list of empanelled hospitals to
choose from [104, 119, 121]. The qualitative study by
the authors among families who had incurred high OOP
expenditure while utilising the PFHI scheme in the pri-
vate sector found that patients and their families exer-
cised their agency to the extent they could but were
rendered helpless and powerless when hospitals
demanded extra payments [115]. The smart card, instead
of being a vehicle to ‘empower’ the patient and enable
‘cashless’ services, was perceived as an opportunity to
extract additional money [115]. The inability of the PFHI
schemes to ensure financial protection in these instances
arose from a combination of prevailing social norms,
such as care as a market transaction rather than a right,
wider cultural acceptance of illegal informal healthcare
payments, power asymmetries between patients and pro-
viders, and the failures of regulatory mechanisms and
oversight [115].
Utilisation of health services flows from the three di-
mensions of access and their interaction. In Chhattis-
garh, utilisation of PFHI schemes follows the pattern of
inequitable availability of hospital services across dis-
tricts [106]. The most vulnerable districts had 3.5 times
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vulnerability districts, with claim amounts following
similar patterns [106]. No studies have been done as yet
on the impact of PFHI schemes on health outcomes in
Chhattisgarh.
Policy process
This section deals with the policy context, actors and
processes under PFHI schemes. Studies have analysed
the evolution of PFHI in India [28, 29] but not specific-
ally in Chhattisgarh. These studies have given rise to a
number of interpretations of the policy process, which in
Chhattisgarh and elsewhere is still unfolding.
Chhattisgarh implemented RSBY as part of the na-
tional scheme but expanded it to universal coverage with
its own funds through the Chief Minister’s Health Insur-
ance Scheme or MSBY, that included the non-poor.
Chhattisgarh is known for leading innovations in health-
care and in other areas of public policy such as initiating
a large Community Health Worker Programme [122], a
3-year medical diploma course to address the shortages
of health practitioners in rural areas [123] and a near-
universal public distribution system (PDS) providing
subsidised grain [124].
The policy direction of a universal PFHI scheme was
possibly prompted by the ruling party’s previous political
success with the much applauded near-universal PDS. In
the case of the PDS, the state had similarly elected to ex-
pand coverage to families not covered by the national
food scheme, through a new scheme called the Chief
Minister’s Food Relief Scheme or MKSY [124]. The ex-
pansion of PFHI scheme in the state occurred in 2012,
just before the state elections in 2013.
The actors involved in policy-making and in advocating
for PFHI at the national level have also influenced devel-
opments in Chhattisgarh State to an extent. The strong
proponents of PFHI include the NITI Aayog (a policy
think tank of the Indian government), the National Health
Authority, international agencies such as the World Bank,
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit
and the Asian Development Bank, UN agencies (WHO,
International Labour Organization), and philanthropic
foundations such as Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation.
While the Health Ministry remains involved both at the
national and the state levels, an autonomous institution,
the National Health Authority, has been formed to imple-
ment PMJAY. Groups representing private healthcare pro-
viders such as the Indian Medical Association have been
vocal in demanding higher package rates and lesser regu-
lation. In 2013, the Indian Medical Association staged a
strike for close to 3 months in the main cities of Chhattis-
garh, suspending all services under PFHI, to pressurise the
government to increase the package rate [52]. PFHI
schemes remain heavily contested in Chhattisgarh andtherefore the newly elected state government has decided
to review the PFHI schemes in the state [125].
Discussion
Studies on PFHI schemes in India and elsewhere have
been limited to one or another element and have not
studied impacts as a whole [24, 34, 126]. There has been
a dearth of studies on assessing the impact of such
schemes for UHC, on the health system and the popula-
tion [10]. Studies on dimensions of access (availability,
affordability and acceptability) in PFHI schemes have
mostly studied financial protection or the affordability
dimension, with less focus on the availability and accept-
ability dimensions [26, 27, 127]. PFHI schemes as instru-
ments of UHC also need to be assessed in terms of their
contribution to equity, human rights, quality and appro-
priateness of health services, strengthening of public
health systems and promotion of health as a social good
[9, 12, 71–75, 128]. Most studies on PFHI schemes have
failed to examine public and private sectors separately
[34], although recent studies in India have started to
examine financial protection by each sector [24, 46].
By formulating an overall conceptual framework for
PFHI schemes, this study has sought to evaluate the im-
pacts of the PFHI scheme in Chhattisgarh holistically.
Chhattisgarh, which has a universal PFHI scheme and
traditions of universalism in public policy, provides the
opportune context for a comprehensive subnational ana-
lysis for assessing these impacts from an equity
perspective.
The equity-based framework presented and applied in
the study could be used for comprehensively assessing
UHC and PFHI schemes elsewhere. This framework
could also be used, as a heuristic device, by those inter-
ested in exploring other kinds of health programmes
and schemes and holistically evaluating UHC-based re-
forms. This framework and its application contribute to
the debate and discussions on PFHI schemes beyond en-
rolment to the determinants of real equity of access
under such schemes. It also brings out the gaps in data
and contributes to future research agenda. From the
available evidence in Chhattisgarh, it is possible to draw
a number of conclusions on the equity impacts of PFHI
schemes in India.
Firstly, high enrolment rates and evidence of equitable
enrolment (gender, social groups, economic and geog-
raphy) from household surveys [105, 106] may mask
specific pockets of inequity within households and
among the most vulnerable communities [107, 119].
This highlights the need for routine population surveys
to be complemented by in-depth, primary studies, exam-
ining experiences of specific vulnerable populations.
Secondly, and most importantly, equitable enrolment
does not automatically lead to financial protection [105],
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[105, 115] or to equity in utilisation [106]. The unequal
availability of hospitals under the scheme was a key fac-
tor in unequal health service utilisation and resource dis-
tribution [106].
Thirdly, the public health sector continues to cater to
the most vulnerable in Chhattisgarh, a finding that cor-
roborates other studies in India [129]. Utilisation, espe-
cially in the private sector, was skewed towards the areas
that had the least health and social need, exhibiting the
‘Inverse Care Law’ [130] with the resource allocation
patterns deepening the ‘infrastructure inequality trap’ in
the state [131]. High enrolment levels among vulnerable
groups and in the most vulnerable districts effectively
aided in mobilising funds into the scheme, which were
effectively transferred from tribal and vulnerable to ‘bet-
ter-off’ areas and from the public to the private sector,
thus deepening inequity [60, 105, 106]. These findings
raise questions regarding the effectiveness of private sec-
tor involvement in bringing about the equity goals of
UHC, a concern that has also been raised by others [6,
90, 132–134].
Fourthly, technological innovations, such as the smart
card and electronic information systems, do not, on their
own, resolve problems rooted in wider normative and
institutional failures. In Chhattisgarh, these include
deeply entrenched practices of co-payment, dominant
norms of healthcare as a market transaction rather than
a right, poor governance, tolerance of conflicts of inter-
ests in decision-making and wider social inequalities [60,
115]. Mechanisms such as the biometric smart card, bill-
ing systems, and data reporting and sharing have not de-
livered on their promises nor led to greater
accountability. More recent studies have indicated that
these problems continue under the PMJAY [135]. Pro-
vider capture remains a central issue in the performance
of PFHI-based policies to achieve UHC in the Indian
context [136].
Finally, PFHI schemes exist within a political economy
of health, which profoundly influences the implemen-
tation and everyday experience of these schemes. The
development of PFHI schemes within the context of
wider neoliberal policies promoting private sector
provisioning has grave consequences for health equity
and access [72].
Key gaps in knowledge relates to the impact of PFHI
schemes on the health system. While there is some evi-
dence on increasing budgetary allocations to PFHI
schemes and the crowding out of funds to the public
sector and other public health programmes [5], more re-
search is needed on the impacts of this on public sector
provision of services (including primary healthcare), hu-
man resource dynamics and supply chains. Research is
specifically needed on the equity implications ofchanging resource allocations. In addition, shifting ser-
vice delivery profiles through practices of ‘cherry pick-
ing’, the provision of narrow and selective services, and
inducing demand [54, 61, 62] need to be better
monitored.
The possibilities and constraints of technology and
real-time data in improving transparency and account-
ability for the public merit further exploration. Research
is needed into the systems and performance of govern-
ment as the regulator and ‘steward’ of PFHI schemes, in
monitoring implementation, ensuring that hospitals ad-
here to the contractual conditions and in promoting
equity.
The study was of one state of India, Chhattisgarh, and
therefore the findings have limitations in their generalis-
ability to rest of India. There are, however, significant
commonalities across the country – all states have a
similar healthcare system, with a private/public mix, and
with PFHI schemes primarily relying on private pro-
viders and focused on hospitalisation care. The findings
on the impact of PFHI schemes are thus likely to be
relevant to other states. Although the equity-based
framework was designed to be comprehensive, the avail-
ability of data for different dimensions was variable.Conclusion
India has been championed as a prime example of ad-
vancing towards UHC through PFHI schemes. The
stated intention of these PFHI schemes is to improve ac-
cess to healthcare and provide financial protection to
the vulnerable. However, as this study shows, the impact
of RSBY/MSBY on equity of access and financial protec-
tion has been weak. Furthermore, to the extent that it
has been studied, the implications for the public sector
and of PFHI scheme funding predominantly channelled
through the private sector are significant. At the point of
service provision, the dominant normative and cultural
orientation of healthcare as a commodity to be sold ra-
ther than a right remains unchallenged.
The findings of this study have immediate relevance
to the present policy context in India, which is currently
integrating existing PFHI schemes into a large expanded
scheme, the PMJAY, for the whole country. The ana-
lysis has shown that an over-reliance on and rapid ex-
pansion of PFHI schemes in the Indian health system is
unlikely to achieve UHC. Chhattisgarh is currently re-
assessing the pitfalls of a private sector emphasis in its
PFHI scheme and re-positioning the public health
system at the core of service provision. Principles of
solidarity, equity and rights are essential as the basis of
health policy for universal healthcare. India still has
some way to go in charting the pathways towards universal
healthcare.
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